Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights

Concentrated Corporate Ownership, (R. Morck, ed.), pp. 295-315, 2000

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 249

29 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 1999 Last revised: 2 Oct 2009

See all articles by Lucian A. Bebchuk

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Reinier Kraakman

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute

George G. Triantis

Stanford Law School

Date Written: 2000

Abstract

This paper examines common arrangements for separating control from cash flow rights: stock pyramids, cross-ownership structures, and dual class equity structures. We describe the ways in which such arrangements enable a controlling shareholder or group to maintain a complete lock on the control of a company while holding less than a majority of the cash flow rights associated with its equity. Next, we analyze the consequences and agency costs of these arrangements. In particular, we show that they have the potential to create very large agency costs—costs that are an order of magnitude larger than those associated with controlling shareholders who hold a majority of the cash flow rights in their companies. The agency costs of these structures, we suggest, are also likely to exceed the agency costs of attending highly leveraged capital structures. Finally, we put forward an agenda for research concerning structures separating control from cash flow rights.

Keywords: Pyramids, dual-class, cross-ownership, cash flow nights, votes, agency costs, corporate governance, law and finance

JEL Classification: G30

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Kraakman, Reinier H. and Triantis, George G., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights (2000). Concentrated Corporate Ownership, (R. Morck, ed.), pp. 295-315, 2000, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 249, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=147590 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.147590

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
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HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Reinier H. Kraakman

Harvard Law School ( email )

1575 Massachusetts
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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-3586 (Phone)
617-496-6118 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

George G. Triantis

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

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