Populist Retribution and International Competition in Financial Services Regulation
Creighton Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2010): 335-55
U of Michigan Law & Econ, Empirical Legal Studies Center Paper No. 10-004
28 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2010 Last revised: 23 Jul 2013
Date Written: January 25, 2010
Abstract
This essay compares the current effort to reform financial services regulation with the regulatory initiatives that come out of the Great Depression. Unlike the 1930s, policymakers today must account for the impact of regulatory competition in crafting responses to the financial crisis. The available evidence suggests that jurisdictional competition is no match for the forces of populist retribution in modern democratic states.
Keywords: Regulatory competition
JEL Classification: D72, G28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation