Risk Sharing, Finance and Institutions in International Portfolios

39 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2007

See all articles by Marcel Fratzscher

Marcel Fratzscher

DIW Berlin; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Jean M. Imbs

Paris School of Economics (PSE); NYU Abu Dhabi; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 7, 2008

Abstract

We develop a standard model to show how transaction costs in international investment affect conventional tests of consumption risk sharing, both in a multilateral and a bilateral setting. We implement the tests in a novel international dataset on bilateral holdings of equity, bonds, foreign direct investment and bank loans. International consumption risk sharing increases with foreign capital holdings; this is especially true of investment in equity or bonds, but not of foreign direct investment or bank loans. In our model, this implies transaction costs are higher for FDI and international loans. The discrepancy may reflect technological differences across asset classes, but also the prospect of expropriation, perhaps most stringent for FDI or loans. We argue that expropriation risk is endogenous to both the borrower`s institutions and its openness to international markets. The detrimental impact of poor institutions is muted in open economies, where the possibility of subsequent exclusion from world markets deters expropriation of foreign capital. We show the implied non-linear effects of institutions prevail in both the cross-section of consumption risk sharing, and in observed international investment patterns.

Keywords: Risk sharing, Diversification, Portfolio Choice, Financial Integration, Cross-Border Investment

JEL Classification: F21, F30, G15

Suggested Citation

Fratzscher, Marcel and Imbs, Jean M. and Imbs, Jean M., Risk Sharing, Finance and Institutions in International Portfolios (March 7, 2008). ECB Working Paper No. 826, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1020965 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1020965

Marcel Fratzscher (Contact Author)

DIW Berlin ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Jean M. Imbs

NYU Abu Dhabi ( email )

PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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