Download This PaperCores and Stable Sets for Interval-Valued Games
CentER Discussion Paper No. 2008-17
15 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2008
Date Written: February 2008
Abstract
In this paper, interval-type solution concepts for interval-valued cooperative games like the interval core, the interval dominance core and stable sets are introduced and studied. The notion of I-balancedness is introduced, and it is proved that the interval core of an interval-valued cooperative game is nonempty if and only if the game is I-balanced. Relations between the interval core, the dominance core and stable sets of an interval-valued game are established.
Keywords: cooperative games, interval games, the core, the dominance core, stable sets
JEL Classification: C71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Alparslan-Gok, Sirma Zeynep and Branzei, Rodica and Tijs, Stef H., Cores and Stable Sets for Interval-Valued Games (February 2008). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2008-17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1094653 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1094653
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