Auction Procedures and Competition in Public Services: The Case of Urban Public Transport in France and London

21 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2008 Last revised: 7 Sep 2008

See all articles by Miguel Amaral

Miguel Amaral

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Stéphane Saussier

IAE - University of Paris I Sorbonne

Anne Yvrande-Billon

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - ATOM Center

Abstract

In many countries, governments are pushing for the introduction of competition in the organization of public services and more broadly in public procurement. The development of public-private partnerships throughout the world is a good illustration of this trend. In order to foster competition, competitive tendering through the use of auctions is now common. Nevertheless, competition for the field must be organized. Depending on the rules of the game chosen, introducing competition for the field may or may not be successful. In this paper we investigate two alternative models for organizing local public services, namely the French and the London models of urban public transport. Few competitors and collusive behaviours, with increasing costs, characterize the French model, while the London model, as far as we have seen, exhibits better results, by using the transparency of auction procedures and the discretionary power of the regulator as two complementary instruments to foster competition and prevent anti-competitive behaviours.

Keywords: public services, transportation, franchise bidding, public-private partnerships, collusion, corruption, auctions

JEL Classification: H0, H7, K00, L33

Suggested Citation

Amaral, Miguel and Saussier, Stephane and Yvrande-Billon, Anne, Auction Procedures and Competition in Public Services: The Case of Urban Public Transport in France and London. Utilities Policy, Fothcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1109115

Miguel Amaral

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

17, rue de la Sorbonne
Paris, IL 75005
France

Stephane Saussier

IAE - University of Paris I Sorbonne ( email )

21, Rue Broca
Paris, 75005
France

Anne Yvrande-Billon (Contact Author)

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - ATOM Center ( email )

Paris cedex 05, 75231
France

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