Two Tales on Resale
39 Pages Posted: 22 May 2008
There are 2 versions of this paper
Two Tales on Resale
Date Written: April 2007
Abstract
In some markets vertically integrated firms sell directly to final customers but also to independent downstream firms with whom they then compete on the downstream market. It is often argued that resellers intensify competition and benefit consumers, in particular when wholesale prices are regulated. However, we show that (i) resale may increase prices and make consumers worse off and that (ii) standard 'retail minus X regulation' may increase prices and harm consumers. Our analysis suggests that this is more likely if the number of integrated firms is small, the degree of product differentiation is low, and/or if competition is spatial.
Keywords: non-spatial product differentiation, resale regulation, spatial product differentiation, vertical restraints, wholesale
JEL Classification: D43, L11, L42, L51
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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