Who Wants to Revise Privatization? The Complementarity of Market Skills and Institutions

48 Pages Posted: 19 May 2009

See all articles by Irina Denisova

Irina Denisova

Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR); New Economic School (NES)

Markus Eller

Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB)

Timothy Frye

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2009

Abstract

Using survey data from 28 transition countries, we test for the complementarity and substitutability of market-relevant skills and institutions. We show that democracy and good governance complement market skills in transition economies. Under autocracy and weak governance institutions there is no significant difference in support for revising privatization between high and low-skilled respondents. As the level of democracy and the quality of governance increases, the difference in the level of support for revising privatization between the high and low skilled grows dramatically. This finding contributes to our understanding of microfoundations of the politics of economic reform.

Keywords: Complementarity, Perception, Privatization, Skills, Transition

JEL Classification: J2, O0, P0

Suggested Citation

Denisova, Irina and Eller, Markus and Frye, Timothy and Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, Who Wants to Revise Privatization? The Complementarity of Market Skills and Institutions (April 2009). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7260, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1405037

Irina Denisova

Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) ( email )

47 Nakhimovsky Prospect, Office #720
117418 Moscow
Russia
+7 095 332 4083 (Phone)

New Economic School (NES)

100A Novaya Street
Moscow, Skolkovo 143026
Russia

Markus Eller

Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) ( email )

Otto-Wagner-Platz 3
Vienna, A-1090
Austria
+43 1 404 20-5227 (Phone)
+43 1 404 20-045227 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.oenb.at/en/Monetary-Policy/Research/Researchers/Markus-Eller.html

Timothy Frye

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

MC3320
420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-3646 (Phone)

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

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