Net Neutrality Regulation: The Economic Evidence

32 Pages Posted: 10 Apr 2010 Last revised: 21 Apr 2013

See all articles by Jerry Brito

Jerry Brito

Independent

Martin E. Cave

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School; Brunel University London

Robert W. Crandall

Brookings Institution; AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

Larry F. Darby

The American Consumer Institute

Everett Ehrlich

ESC Company

Jeffrey A. Eisenach

NERA Economic Consulting; American Enterprise Institute

Jerry Ellig

George Washington University - Regulatory Studies Center (deceased)

Henry Ergas

Independent

David J. Farber

Carnegie Mellon University - School of Computer Science

Gerald R. Faulhaber

University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School

Robert W. Hahn

Technology Policy Institute; University of Oxford, Smith School

Alfred E. Kahn

National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) (Deceased)

Wayne A. Leighton

Francisco Marroquin University

Robert E. Litan

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) - Council on Foreign Relations- Washington D.C.

Glen O. Robinson

University of Virginia School of Law

Hal J. Singer

Econ One

Vernon L. Smith

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; Chapman University School of Law

William E. Taylor

Marsh & McLennan Companies - Cambridge Office

Timothy J. Tardiff

Advanced Analytical Consulting Group, Inc.

Leonard Waverman

London Business School

Dennis Weisman

Kansas State University - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 12, 2010

Abstract

In the authors' shared opinion, the economic evidence does not support the regulations proposed in the Commission’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Preserving the Open Internet and Broadband Industry Practices (the “NPRM”). To the contrary, the economic evidence provides no support for the existence of market failure sufficient to warrant ex ante regulation of the type proposed by the Commission, and strongly suggests that the regulations, if adopted, would reduce consumer welfare in both the short and long run. To the extent the types of conduct addressed in the NPRM may, in isolated circumstances, have the potential to harm competition or consumers, the Commission and other regulatory bodies have the ability to deter or prohibit such conduct on a case-by-case basis, through the application of existing doctrines and procedures. Hence, the approach advocated in the NPRM is not necessary to achieve whatever economic benefits may be associated with prohibiting harmful discrimination on the Internet.

Keywords: net neutrality, FCC, Internet, broadband, regulation

Suggested Citation

Brito, Jerry and Cave, Martin E. and Crandall, Robert and Darby, Larry F. and Ehrlich, Everett and Eisenach, Jeffrey A. and Ellig, Jerry and Ergas, Henry and Farber, David J. and Faulhaber, Gerald R. and Hahn, Robert W. and Kahn, Alfred E. and Leighton, Wayne A. and Litan, Robert E. and Robinson, Glen O. and Singer, Hal J. and Smith, Vernon L. and Taylor, William E. and Tardiff, Timothy J. and Waverman, Leonard and Weisman, Dennis, Net Neutrality Regulation: The Economic Evidence (April 12, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1587058 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1587058

Jerry Brito

Independent ( email )

Martin E. Cave

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School ( email )

Centre for Management under Regulation (CMuR)
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

Brunel University London

Kingston Lane
Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH
United Kingdom

Robert Crandall

Brookings Institution ( email )

1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2188
United States
202-797-6291 (Phone)
202-797-6181 (Fax)

AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Larry F. Darby

The American Consumer Institute ( email )

1701 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20006
United States

Everett Ehrlich

ESC Company ( email )

Washington, DC
United States

Jeffrey A. Eisenach (Contact Author)

NERA Economic Consulting

1255 23rd Street, NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20037
United States
202-448-9029 (Phone)
202-466-3605 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.nera.com

American Enterprise Institute ( email )

1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Jerry Ellig

George Washington University - Regulatory Studies Center (deceased) ( email )

805 21st St. NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States
703-375-9410 (Phone)

Henry Ergas

Independent ( email )

David J. Farber

Carnegie Mellon University - School of Computer Science ( email )

5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
United States

Gerald R. Faulhaber

University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School ( email )

Steinberg-Dietrich Hall
Suite 1400
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States
215-898-7860 (Phone)

Robert W. Hahn

Technology Policy Institute ( email )

1401 Eye St. NW
Suite 505
Washington, DC 20005
United States

University of Oxford, Smith School ( email )

Oxford
United Kingdom

Alfred E. Kahn

National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) (Deceased)

Wayne A. Leighton

Francisco Marroquin University ( email )

6 calle final, zona 10
Guatemala City, 01010
Guatemala

Robert E. Litan

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) - Council on Foreign Relations- Washington D.C. ( email )

1777 F Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
United States

Glen O. Robinson

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
(434) 924-3621 (Phone)

Hal J. Singer

Econ One ( email )

805 15th Street
Suite 501
Washington, DC 20005
United States
202.312.3065 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.econone.com/staff-member/hal-singer/

Vernon L. Smith

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

1 University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States
714-628-2830 (Phone)

Chapman University School of Law ( email )

One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866-1099
United States

William E. Taylor

Marsh & McLennan Companies - Cambridge Office ( email )

One Main Street, 5th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-621-2615 (Phone)

Timothy J. Tardiff

Advanced Analytical Consulting Group, Inc. ( email )

Advanced Analytical Consulting Group, Inc.
112 Water Street, 3rd Floor
Boston, MA 02109
United States
6178274043 (Phone)

Leonard Waverman

London Business School ( email )

Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom

Dennis Weisman

Kansas State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Manhattan, KS 66502-4001
United States

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