The Roots of Executive Power

52 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2010 Last revised: 19 Aug 2010

See all articles by Thad Kousser

Thad Kousser

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science

Justin Phillips

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: August 17, 2010

Abstract

How do America's chief executives get what they want out of the legislative process when their only formal power comes when bills arrive on their desks? We argue that executives are often able to get what they want by using their veto pen as a positive power and by relying upon a variety of additional carrots and sticks. We illustrate the logic of our argument by adapting Romer and Rosenthals's (1978) "setter model." We explain the intuition behind our model using case studies and interviews with politicians and advisors who have participated in inter-branch negotiations. To test our model's predictions about the determinants of gubernatorial success we have compiled a dataset of gubernatorial proposals from 52 State of the State addresses delivered in 27 states over two recent legislative sessions. We gauge success by asking whether legislators eventually passed what governors proposed, either in its original form or in "half-a-loaf" compromises. We supplement this data with institutional and political variables. Overall we show that governors get either most or some of what they want on over 50 percent of their legislative proposals. We also demonstrate that variation in success is often shaped by the governors' policy preferences, veto powers, popularity, and time remaining in office.

Keywords: governor, bargaining, state government, veto, chief executive, agenda

JEL Classification: P16, H70

Suggested Citation

Kousser, Thad and Phillips, Justin, The Roots of Executive Power (August 17, 2010). APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1642145

Thad Kousser (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Code 0521
La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
United States

Justin Phillips

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

7th Floor, International Affairs Bldg.
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

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