Protection and International Sourcing

38 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2010

See all articles by Emanuel Ornelas

Emanuel Ornelas

Sao Paulo School of Economics

John L. Turner

University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics

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Date Written: October 2010

Abstract

We study the impact of import protection on relationship-specific investments, organizational choice and welfare. We show that a tariff on intermediate inputs can improve social welfare through mitigating hold-up problems. It does so if it discriminates in favor of the investing parties, which the tariff achieves by making trade with outsiders more costly. On the other hand, a tariff can prompt inefficient organizational choices if it discriminates in favor of less productive domestic suppliers or if integration costs are low. Protection distorts organizational choices because tariff revenue, which is external to the firms, drives a wedge between the private and social gains to offshoring and integration. Since contract incompleteness affects investment and production decisions differently depending on the organization form, the intensity of this externality varies with organization form. Hence, protection mitigates domestic hold-up problems but inefficiently curbs offshoring. This suggests a role for moderate protection of inputs trade for firms outsourcing domestically, if the protection is coupled with incentives for offshoring activities.

Keywords: hold-up problem, international trade, organizational form, sourcing, tariffs

JEL Classification: D23, F13, L22, L23

Suggested Citation

Ornelas, Emanuel and Turner, John L., Protection and International Sourcing (October 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8070, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1711083

Emanuel Ornelas (Contact Author)

Sao Paulo School of Economics ( email )

Rua Itapeva 474 s.1202
São Paulo, São Paulo 01332-000
Brazil

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/emanuelornelaseo/

John L. Turner

University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States

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