Bank Credit and Business Networks

53 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2011 Last revised: 29 Oct 2014

See all articles by Asim Ijaz Khwaja

Asim Ijaz Khwaja

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies (CeRP); Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Atif R. Mian

Princeton University - Department of Economics; Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs; NBER

Abid Qamar

State Bank of Pakistan

Date Written: February 17, 2011

Abstract

We construct the topology of business networks across the population of firms in an emerging economy, Pakistan, and estimate the value that membership in large yet diffuse networks brings in terms of access to bank credit and improving financial viability. We link two firms if they have a common director. The resulting topology includes a "giant network" that is order of magnitudes larger than the second largest network. While it displays "small world" properties and comprises 5 percent of all firms, it accesses two-thirds of all bank credit. We estimate the value of joining this giant network by exploiting "incidental" entry and exit of firms over time. Membership increases total external financing by 16.6 percent, reduces the propensity to enter financial distress by 9.5 percent, and better insures firms against industry and location shocks. Firms that join improve financial access by borrowing more from new lenders, particularly those already lending to their (new) giant-network neighbors. Network benefits also depend critically on where a firm connects to in the network and on the firm's pre-existing strength.

Keywords: Business Networks, Financial Development, Bank Credit, Network Analysis

JEL Classification: L14, O16, D85, D02

Suggested Citation

Khwaja, Asim Ijaz and Mian, Atif R. and Qamar, Abid, Bank Credit and Business Networks (February 17, 2011). HKS Working Paper No. RWP11-017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1763351 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1763351

Asim Ijaz Khwaja (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

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Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies (CeRP) ( email )

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Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD) ( email )

Duke University
Durham, NC 90097
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Atif R. Mian

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

NBER

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Abid Qamar

State Bank of Pakistan ( email )

I.I. Chundrigar Road
KARACHI, Sindh 74000
Pakistan

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