The Costs of Conflict

Abstract

Violent conflict destroy resources. It generates "destruction costs." These costs have an important effect on individual's decisions to cooperate or conflict. We develop two models of conflict: one in which conflict's destruction costs are independent of individuals' investment in "arms" - the tools of conflict - and another in which conflict's destruction costs depend on those investments. Our models demonstrate that when conflict's destruction costs are arms-dependent, conflict is more costly, making cooperation more likely. We test this prediction with a laboratory experiment in which subjects first choose how heavily to invest in arms and then choose whether to cooperate or conflict in an environment where interaction is repeated. In one set of treatments conflict's destruction costs are arms-independent. In another they are arms-dependent. Our experimental results support our model's predictions. Compared to when conflict's destruction costs are arms-independent, when those costs are arms-dependent, cooperation increases by nearly a third.

Keywords: conflict, anarchy, experimental economics, political economy

JEL Classification: C92, D74