Innovation Subsidies: Does the Funding Source Matter for Innovation Intensity and Performance? Empirical Evidence from Germany

43 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2012

See all articles by Dirk Czarnitzki

Dirk Czarnitzki

KU Leuven - Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy, and Innovation; Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Cindy Lopes-Bento

K.U.Leuven; ZEW

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 1, 2011

Abstract

Applying a variant of a non-parametric matching estimator, we consider European funding and national funding as heterogeneous treatments, distinguishing and simultaneously analyzing the effect these treatments have on innovation input and performance. In terms of input, getting funding from both sources yields the highest impact. If funding from only one source is received, EU grants have higher effects. In terms of output, holding innovation expenditures constant, funding from both sources display higher sales of market novelties and future patent applications at the firm level. If only one grant is obtained, we find superiority for national funding.

Keywords: Subsidies, Innovation, Policy Evaluation, Treatment Effects, Nonparametric matching estimation

JEL Classification: C14, H50, O38

Suggested Citation

Czarnitzki, Dirk and Lopes-Bento, Cindy, Innovation Subsidies: Does the Funding Source Matter for Innovation Intensity and Performance? Empirical Evidence from Germany (July 1, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2004357 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2004357

Dirk Czarnitzki (Contact Author)

KU Leuven - Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy, and Innovation ( email )

Naamsestraat 69 bus 3500
Leuven, 3000
Belgium

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Cindy Lopes-Bento

K.U.Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium

ZEW ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

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