The Value Function Theorem for Combinatorial Auctions and a New Proof of the Existence of Market Equilibrium for Assignment Problems

7 Pages Posted: 26 May 2012

Date Written: May 25, 2012

Abstract

In this paper we provide a new proof of the existence of market equilibrium for a linear assignment problem.

Keywords: assignment problem, combinatorial auction, market equilibrium

JEL Classification: C71, C78

Suggested Citation

Lahiri, Somdeb, The Value Function Theorem for Combinatorial Auctions and a New Proof of the Existence of Market Equilibrium for Assignment Problems (May 25, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2066587 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2066587

Somdeb Lahiri (Contact Author)

Lok Jagruti (LJ) University ( email )

S.G. Road & Kataria Motors
Sarkhej Circle
Ahmedabad, IN Gujarat 382210
India

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/somdeblahiri/home

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
31
Abstract Views
433
PlumX Metrics