Co-Operation and Timing
CARESS Working Paper No. 95-05
7 Pages Posted: 23 Nov 2000
Date Written: 1995
Abstract
If players cannot perfectly synchronize their actions in a coordination game, an efficient outcome will never be achieved.
Keywords: coordination, common knowledge
JEL Classification: C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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