Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate

50 Pages Posted: 11 Apr 2003 Last revised: 26 Mar 2024

See all articles by Lucian A. Bebchuk

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alma Cohen

Harvard Law School; Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: 2003

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates the determinants of firms’ decisions where to incorporate. We find that states that offer stronger antitakeover protections are substantially more successful both in retaining in-state firms and in attracting out-of-state incorporations. We estimate that, compared with adopting no antitakeover statutes, adopting all standard antitakeover statutes enabled the states that adopted them to more than double the percentage of local firms that incorporated in-state (from 23% to 49%). Indeed, we find no evidence that the incorporation market has even penalized the three states that passed antitakeover statutes widely viewed as detrimental to shareholders. We also find that there is commonly a big difference between a state’s ability to attract incorporations from firms located in and out of the state, and we investigate several possible explanations for this home-state advantage.

The data on which this paper is based is available for download at Lucian Bebchuk's home page.

Keywords: Delaware, incorporation, corporate governance, regulatory competition, managers, shareholders, takeovers, antitakeover statutes, antitakeover defenses, home bias

JEL Classification: G30, G38, H70, K22

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Cohen, Alma, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate (2003). Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 46, pp. 383-425, 2003, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 351, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 003/2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=304386 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.304386

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Alma Cohen (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(617) 496-4099 (Phone)
(617) 812-0554 (Fax)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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