The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis When Collective Choice Matters

Winer, Stanley L.; Hettich, Walter

doi:10.2139/ssrn.388001

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The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis When Collective Choice Matters

Carleton University, Economic Working Paper No. 02-11

32 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2003

See all articles by Stanley L. Winer

Stanley L. Winer

Carleton University - School of Public Policy and Administration; Carleton University-Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Walter Hettich

California State University, Fullerton - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 2003

Abstract

In this paper we review both positive and normative aspects of taxation. We examine how to study why taxes and revenue structures have taken their present form and why they are used in a particular way as part of the democratic process. In addition, we also consider the classic normative questions, namely what makes a good tax system and how to assess the efficiency of taxation. In dealing with both aspects of the tax literature, we attempt to set out a plan for a more complete and comprehensive analysis of taxation in the face of collective choice than is attempted in most of the available literature on fiscal issues.

Keywords: taxation, revenue structure, collective choice, democratic process, optimal tax

JEL Classification: D70, H10, H11, H20, H21

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Winer, Stanley L. and Hettich, Walter, The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis When Collective Choice Matters (January 2003). Carleton University, Economic Working Paper No. 02-11, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=388001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.388001