Cutting the Dividends Tax . . . And Corporate Governance Too?

12 Pages Posted: 20 Nov 2003

See all articles by Dino Falaschetti

Dino Falaschetti

US Treasury

Michael J. Orlando

Econ One Research, Inc.; University of Colorado - Denver

Date Written: August 6, 2005

Abstract

Economists tend to agree that the recent cutting of dividends taxes will encourage investment and reduce financial distress. In addition to creating these benefits, however, the tax cut can also increase governance costs. For example, by removing a bias for leveraged capital structures, the tax cut foregoes debt's superiority on at least three dimensions:

1. Evaluating and monitoring demanders of financial capital;

2. Constraining managerial agents' from opportunistically employing capital market proceeds; and

3. Encouraging non-financial stakeholders (e.g., employees, suppliers) to make firm-specific investments.

Moreover, because these privately produced services contribute to the integrity of broader financial markets (i.e., a public good), competitive forces may not fully counter the tax cut's governance consequences.

Keywords: Dividends Tax, Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: G32, G38, H25

Suggested Citation

Falaschetti, Dino and Orlando, Michael J., Cutting the Dividends Tax . . . And Corporate Governance Too? (August 6, 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=471021 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.471021

Dino Falaschetti (Contact Author)

US Treasury ( email )

Office of Financial Research
Washington, DC District of Columbia 20220
United States

Michael J. Orlando

Econ One Research, Inc. ( email )

United States

University of Colorado - Denver ( email )

1475 Lawrence St.
Suite 4001
Denver, CO 80202
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/business/degrees/ms/gem/Pages/faculty.aspx

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