Antitrust Holdup Source, Cross-National Institutional Variation, and Corporate Political Strategy Implications for Domestic Mergers in a Global Context

WZB, Markets and Political Economy Working Paper No. SP II 2004-09

59 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2004

See all articles by Joseph A. Clougherty

Joseph A. Clougherty

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Date Written: June 2004

Abstract

Managers are increasingly uncertain over the source (home-nation or foreign-nation) of antitrust holdup for domestic mergers with significant international implications. I propose a conceptual framework that predicts the source of antitrust holdup for domestic mergers. Under idealized institutional assumptions, I find an industry's global competitiveness to be the primary driver behind holdup source: a contention supported by empirical tests based on the merger policies of 27 antitrust jurisdictions over the 1992-2000 period. I also relax the idealized institutional conditions to yield more precise propositions tailored to the cross-national environment for antitrust policy. Finally, I generate prescriptive propositions that yield implications for effective political strategies.

Keywords: Corporate Political Strategy, Non-Market Strategy, Merger Reviews, Antitrust

JEL Classification: L40, M20, F14

Suggested Citation

Clougherty, Joseph A., Antitrust Holdup Source, Cross-National Institutional Variation, and Corporate Political Strategy Implications for Domestic Mergers in a Global Context (June 2004). WZB, Markets and Political Economy Working Paper No. SP II 2004-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=558187 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.558187

Joseph A. Clougherty (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

1206 S. Sixth Street
330 Wohlers Hall, MC-706
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
117
Abstract Views
1,451
Rank
427,869
PlumX Metrics