Fact-Free Learning, Second Version

32 Pages Posted: 5 Jan 2005

See all articles by Enriqueta Aragones

Enriqueta Aragones

Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) - Insitute for Economic Analysis

Itzhak Gilboa

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

David Schmeidler

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Ohio State University (OSU)

Date Written: December 2004

Abstract

People may be surprised by noticing certain regularities that hold in existing knowledge they have had for some time. That is, they may learn without getting new factual information. We argue that this can be partly explained by computational complexity. We show that, given a knowledge base, finding a small set of variables that obtain a certain value of R2 is computationally hard, in the sense that this term is used in computer science. We discuss some of the implications of this result and of fact-free learning in general.

Note: A previous version of this abstract can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=460203

Keywords: Learning, Behavioral Economics

JEL Classification: D11

Suggested Citation

Aragonés, Enriqueta and Gilboa, Itzhak and Postlewaite, Andrew and Schmeidler, David, Fact-Free Learning, Second Version (December 2004). PIER Working Paper No. 05-002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=643545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.643545

Enriqueta Aragonés (Contact Author)

Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) - Insitute for Economic Analysis ( email )

08193 Bellaterra
Spain
34-93-580-6612 (Phone)
34-93-580-1452 (Fax)

Itzhak Gilboa

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
972-3-640-6423 (Phone)
972-3-640-9908 (Fax)

HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences

Paris
France

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7350 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~apostlew

David Schmeidler

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972-3-640-9643 (Phone)
+972-3-640-9357 (Fax)

Ohio State University (OSU) ( email )

Blankenship Hall-2010
901 Woody Hayes Drive
Columbus, OH OH 43210
United States

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