Residential Segregation in General Equilibrium

57 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2005 Last revised: 27 Oct 2022

See all articles by Patrick J. Bayer

Patrick J. Bayer

Duke University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Robert McMillan

University of Toronto - Department of Economics

Kim S. Rueben

Tax Policy Center

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2005

Abstract

Black households in the United States with high levels of income and education (SES) typically face a stark tradeoff when deciding where to live. They can choose neighborhoods with high levels of public goods or a high proportion of blacks, but very few neighborhoods combine both, a fact we document clearly. In the face of this constraint, we conjecture that racial sorting may dramatically lower the consumption of local public goods by high-SES blacks. To shed light on this, we estimate a model of residential sorting using unusually detailed restricted Census microdata, then use the estimated preferences to simulate a counterfactual world in which racial factors play no role in household residential location decisions. Results from this exercise provide the first evidence that sorting on the basis of race gives rise to significant reductions in the consumption of local public goods by black and high-SES black households in particular. These consumption effects lead to significant losses of welfare and are likely to have important intergenerational implications.

Suggested Citation

Bayer, Patrick J. and McMillan, Robert and Rueben, Kim S., Residential Segregation in General Equilibrium (January 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11095, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=656585

Patrick J. Bayer (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Robert McMillan

University of Toronto - Department of Economics ( email )

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Kim S. Rueben

Tax Policy Center ( email )

Urban Institute
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Washington, DC 20009
United States

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