Learning and Belief Based Trade

12 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2006

See all articles by Drew Fudenberg

Drew Fudenberg

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

David K. Levine

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 2006

Abstract

We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade results do not require that gains from trade are common knowledge nor that play is a Nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David K. and Levine, David K., Learning and Belief Based Trade (March 2006). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2113, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=888762 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.888762

Drew Fudenberg (Contact Author)

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David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics ( email )

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European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

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