The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard With Envious Agents

31 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2006 Last revised: 2 Jun 2011

See all articles by Björn Bartling

Björn Bartling

University of Zurich - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Ferdinand von Siemens

Goethe University Frankfurt; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: October 7, 2009

Abstract

While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms are often not explicitly incentivized. This paper offers an explanation for this observation based on the assumption that agents are envious and suffer utility losses if others receive higher wages. We analyze the impact of envy on optimal incentive contracts in a general moral hazard model and isolate the countervailing effects of envy on the costs of providing incentives. We show that envy creates a tendency towards flat-wage contracts if agents are risk-averse and there is no limited liability. Empirical evidence suggests that social comparisons are more pronounced among employees within firms than among individuals that interact in markets. Flat-wage contracts are then more likely to be optimal in firms.

Keywords: envy, moral hazard, flat-wage contracts, within-firm vs. market interactions, wage secrecy, boundary of the firm

JEL Classification: D82, J3, M5

Suggested Citation

Bartling, Björn and von Siemens, Ferdinand, The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard With Envious Agents (October 7, 2009). Labour Economics, Vol. 17, p. 598-607, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=896067

Björn Bartling (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Ferdinand Von Siemens

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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