Migrant Smuggling When Exploitation Is Private Information
Canadian Journal of Economics, Forthcoming
19 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2007 Last revised: 7 Mar 2013
Date Written: January 29, 2013
Abstract
This study contributes to the small theoretical literature on human smuggling by assuming for the first time asymmetric information in analysis. The assumption raises the possibility of an adverse selection equilibrium where only exploitative smugglers are employed at a low fee even though migrants are willing to pay nonexploitative smugglers a high fee. More importantly, I find that improved inland apprehension of migrants may increase the incidence of migrant exploitation while failing to decrease smuggling attempts. Furthermore, improved border apprehension of migrants and smugglers may not affect the market at all.
Keywords: illegal migration, people smuggling, migrant exploitation, human trafficking, adverse selection
JEL Classification: F22, J68, D82, L15, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation