Migrant Smuggling When Exploitation Is Private Information

Canadian Journal of Economics, Forthcoming

19 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2007 Last revised: 7 Mar 2013

See all articles by Yuji Tamura

Yuji Tamura

Department of Accounting, Data Analytics, Economics and Finance, La Trobe University; ANU Centre for Economic Policy Research, Australian National University

Date Written: January 29, 2013

Abstract

This study contributes to the small theoretical literature on human smuggling by assuming for the first time asymmetric information in analysis. The assumption raises the possibility of an adverse selection equilibrium where only exploitative smugglers are employed at a low fee even though migrants are willing to pay nonexploitative smugglers a high fee. More importantly, I find that improved inland apprehension of migrants may increase the incidence of migrant exploitation while failing to decrease smuggling attempts. Furthermore, improved border apprehension of migrants and smugglers may not affect the market at all.

Keywords: illegal migration, people smuggling, migrant exploitation, human trafficking, adverse selection

JEL Classification: F22, J68, D82, L15, K42

Suggested Citation

Tamura, Yuji, Migrant Smuggling When Exploitation Is Private Information (January 29, 2013). Canadian Journal of Economics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=964011 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.964011

Yuji Tamura (Contact Author)

Department of Accounting, Data Analytics, Economics and Finance, La Trobe University ( email )

Melbourne, VIC 3086
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.latrobe.edu.au/accounting-data-analytics-economics-and-finance

ANU Centre for Economic Policy Research, Australian National University

Canberra, ACT 2600
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://rse.anu.edu.au/research/centre-economic-policy-research

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