Mechanisms to Meet/Beat Analyst Earnings Expectations in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Eras

44 Pages Posted: 8 Oct 2008

See all articles by Eli Bartov

Eli Bartov

NYU Stern School of Business

Daniel A. Cohen

Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2007

Abstract

This paper asks two questions. First, has the prevalence of expectations management tomeet/beat analyst expectations changed in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 accountingscandals and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)? Second, has the mixamong the three mechanisms used for meeting earnings targets: accrual earningsmanagement, real earnings management, and earnings expectations management shiftedin the Post-SOX Period? We document that the propensity to meet/beat analyst expectations has declined significantly in the Post-SOX Period. Our primary findings explain this pattern. In particular, we find a decline in the use of expectations management and accrual management, and no change in real earnings management in the Post-SOX Period relative to the preceding seven-year period. Our results are robust to controlling for varying macro economic conditions. These findings contribute to the academic literature, investors, and regulators.

Suggested Citation

Bartov, Eli and Cohen, Daniel A., Mechanisms to Meet/Beat Analyst Earnings Expectations in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Eras (April 2007). NYU Working Paper No. 2451/27549, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1280712

Eli Bartov (Contact Author)

NYU Stern School of Business ( email )

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212.998.0016 (Phone)

Daniel A. Cohen

Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management ( email )

401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States

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