An Anti-Monopoly Law for China - Scaling the Walls of Protectionist Government Restraints

Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 74, 2007

Economic Law Research, Vol. 5, No. 107, May 2007, (A similar paper has been published in Mandarin)

NYU Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 07-13

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-27

31 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2007

See all articles by Eleanor M. Fox

Eleanor M. Fox

New York University School of Law

Abstract

China's legislators are debating the enactment of an anti-monopoly law. The pending draft legislation would prohibit abuse of administrative monopoly. Administrative abuses are provincial and local measures that discriminate against and burden goods and services from other provinces and localities. State-owned monopolies would apparently be covered by the law except in regulated industries.

Most nations deal with abusive government restraints and abusive private restraints by different instruments of law. This essay demonstrates, however, the integral nature of public and private protectionist restraints. It provides examples of integrated analysis in the United States, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization. It argues that a Chinese effort to address administrative economic abuses in its competition law would be progressive and helpful to the Chinese economy, especially in the absence of a Chinese "Commerce Clause." Also, it argues for fuller coverage of state-owned monopolies. SOEs and provincial and local protectionist restraints are among China's most significant obstacles to realizing the benefits of markets.

Suggested Citation

Fox, Eleanor M., An Anti-Monopoly Law for China - Scaling the Walls of Protectionist Government Restraints. Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 74, 2007, Economic Law Research, Vol. 5, No. 107, May 2007, (A similar paper has been published in Mandarin), NYU Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 07-13, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-27, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1003162

Eleanor M. Fox (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6171 (Phone)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,285
Abstract Views
5,154
Rank
29,328
PlumX Metrics