The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for Environmental Regulation

28 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2008 Last revised: 15 May 2008

See all articles by Keith N. Hylton

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

Abstract

I explore the economic structure of nuisance law as a mechanism for regulating environmental interferences and propose a modernized enforcement regime. The modern regime would retain public enforcement primarily in identifying environmental harms and as a backstop for private enforcement.

Keywords: economic structure of nuisance law, nuisance law, environmental regulation, command and control rules, liability rules, public enforcement, private enforcement, decentralization inefficiencies, agency cost problems, cost-benefit balancing of the common law

JEL Classification: K00, K13, K32, K41

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for Environmental Regulation. Case Western Reserve Law Review, 2008, Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-13, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1112631

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)

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