Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win

91 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2007 Last revised: 20 Jul 2008

See all articles by Richard Moberly

Richard Moberly

University of Nebraska College of Law

Abstract

Scholars praise the whistleblower protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as one of the most protective anti-retaliation provisions in the world. Yet, during its first three years, only 3.6% of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers won relief through the initial administrative process that adjudicates such claims, and only 6.5% of whistleblowers won appeals through the process. This Article reports the results of an empirical study of all Department of Labor Sarbanes-Oxley determinations during this time, consisting of over 700 separate decisions from administrative investigations and hearings. The results of this detailed analysis demonstrate that administrative decision-makers strictly construed, and in some cases misapplied, Sarbanes-Oxley's substantive protections to the significant disadvantage of employees. These data-based findings assist in identifying the provisions and procedures of the Act that do not work as Congress intended as well as suggest potential remedies for these statutory and administrative deficiencies.

Keywords: whistleblower, whistleblowing, employment, anti-retaliation, retaliation, corporate fraud

Suggested Citation

Moberly, Richard, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win. William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 49, p. 65, 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=977802

Richard Moberly (Contact Author)

University of Nebraska College of Law ( email )

103 McCollum Hall
P.O. Box 830902
Lincoln, NE 68583-0902
United States
402-472-1256 (Phone)

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