'Think Global, Act Local': Employee Representation in a World of Global Labor and Product Market Competition

Virginia Journal of Law & Business, Vol. 4, No. 1, May 2009

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-45

15 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2008 Last revised: 8 May 2009

Date Written: February 16, 2009

Abstract

The decline of unionization rates in private companies, while at an especially low point below 10% in the U.S., is a worldwide phenomenon, hastened by the emergence of global labor and product market competition. The dilemma for public policy is that while strong unions can promote worker voice and economic participation, they do so in a manner that harms firm performance where all companies competing in the same product market are not subject to the same union standards. Global markets make it increasingly difficult for unions to pursue traditional redistributive goals, bringing to the fore an alternative model of workplace representation that emphasizes pursuit of objectives that do not undermine firm profits. Although global labor standards are often suggested as a means of improving the ability of U.S. workers to compete on a "level playing field" with workers in other countries, this approach is not likely to succeed if developing countries are to pursue their competitive advantage as lower-cost producers. Rather, the path for U.S. public policy should be two-pronged: (1) strengthening the protections for workers seeking collective representation, while (2) removing disincentives in current institutional arrangements that retard the evolution of unions as integrative bargaining agents.

Keywords: Labor Law, Competition, Global Labor Markets,Global Product Markets, Integrative Bargaining, Redistributive Bargaining

Suggested Citation

Estreicher, Samuel, 'Think Global, Act Local': Employee Representation in a World of Global Labor and Product Market Competition (February 16, 2009). Virginia Journal of Law & Business, Vol. 4, No. 1, May 2009 , NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-45, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1292369

Samuel Estreicher (Contact Author)

New York University Law School ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
(212) 998-6226 (Phone)
(212) 995-4341 (Fax)

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