The Constitutional Court's Decision in the Dispute between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission: Banishing Judicial Accountability?

DEMOCRACY AND THE PROMISE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE, Andrew MacIntyre and Ross McLeod, eds., pp. 178-200, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore

Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 09/31

30 Pages Posted: 7 May 2009

See all articles by Simon Butt

Simon Butt

The University of Sydney - Faculty of Law

Date Written: May 7, 2009

Abstract

Since former President Soeharto was forced to resign in 1998, the Indonesian judiciary has been significantly reformed. A Judicial Commission was established to monitor its performance. A Constitutional Court was also created; one of its tasks is to decide disputes between state institutions and to review the constitutionality of statutes. This paper discusses the Constitutional Court case in which several Supreme Court judges alleged that the Constitution’s guarantee of judicial independence precluded the Judicial Commission from supervising the Supreme Court’s performance by critically analysing its decisions. The Constitutional Court accepted this argument, declaring that the Indonesian Constitution prohibited the Judicial Commission from performing this function. This paper discusses this case and its potential ramifications.

Keywords: Indonesia, law, constitutional law, judicial review, comparative law

JEL Classification: K10, K30

Suggested Citation

Butt, Simon, The Constitutional Court's Decision in the Dispute between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission: Banishing Judicial Accountability? (May 7, 2009). DEMOCRACY AND THE PROMISE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE, Andrew MacIntyre and Ross McLeod, eds., pp. 178-200, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore, Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 09/31, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1400524

Simon Butt (Contact Author)

The University of Sydney - Faculty of Law ( email )

New Law Building, F10
The University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia

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