The Market Abuse Directive Disclosure Regime in Practice: Some Margins for Future Actions

Rivista delle Società, No. 4/2009, 2009

39 Pages Posted: 10 Jun 2009

See all articles by Carmine Di Noia

Carmine Di Noia

LUISS - Guido Carli University; OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

Matteo Gargantini

University of Genoa; Genoa Centre for Law and Finance; EUSFIL Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence

Date Written: June 10, 2009

Abstract

The paper provides an analysis of some of the major problems which have emerged in the aftermath of the Market abuse directive (MAD) implementation and makes some proposals for the revision of the MAD regime with respect to issuers obligations. After briefly describing the MAD regulatory framework, the paper deals with the topic of the single notion of inside information in the context of issuers’ disclosure obligations and the delay in the disclosure of inside information, as well as with rumours and directors’ dealings. The problem of safe harbours and accepted market practices is then debated.

The overall results of the analysis show that, in spite of the intended setting of a coherent European regulation on issuers’ and intermediaries’ duties, some further actions are still needed in order to reach a thorough harmonisation across the EU.

Suggested Citation

Di Noia, Carmine and Gargantini, Matteo, The Market Abuse Directive Disclosure Regime in Practice: Some Margins for Future Actions (June 10, 2009). Rivista delle Società, No. 4/2009, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1417477

Carmine Di Noia (Contact Author)

LUISS - Guido Carli University ( email )

ROMA
Italy

OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ( email )

Paris
France

Matteo Gargantini

University of Genoa ( email )

Via Balbi 5
Genova, 16126
Italy

Genoa Centre for Law and Finance ( email )

Via Balbi
22
Genoa, Genoa 16100
Italy

EUSFIL Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence ( email )

Italy

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