Moral Reasons and the Limitations of Liberty

William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 40, p. 947, 1999

11 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2009

See all articles by Jeffrie G. Murphy

Jeffrie G. Murphy

Arizona State University College of Law

Date Written: 1999

Abstract

I find myself in substantial agreement with Professor Dworkin, and I find this deeply disturbing - not merely because it will make my role as his commentator more difficult, but also for reasons of a more personal nature. In Bowers, however, this distinction was lost on Justice White; for in Bowers, once he had decided that citizen disapproval of homosexual sodomy was moral disapproval, he concluded that the rational basis test had been satisfied, with no inquiry at all into the question of whether the moral judgment involved is a rational or reasonable moral judgment or perhaps simply a judgment of unexampled stupidity, ignorance, prejudice, and animus. By arguing that disapproval of homosexuality may not be moral disapproval and that moral disapproval of homosexuality may not be rational, I have tried to fill out in some detail my reading of two of Professor Dworkin's claims - the claim that our thinking about issues such as homosexuality requires a plausible account of what is involved in the making of moral judgments, and the claim (made in the final sentence of his essay) that the reason that homosexual conduct ought not to be criminalized is that there is nothing immoral in such activity.

Keywords: Homosexuality, moral judgment, liberty

Suggested Citation

Murphy, Jeffrie G., Moral Reasons and the Limitations of Liberty (1999). William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 40, p. 947, 1999, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1462862

Jeffrie G. Murphy (Contact Author)

Arizona State University College of Law ( email )

Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States
(480) 965-5856 (Phone)
(480) 965-2427 (Fax)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
74
Abstract Views
1,355
Rank
573,886
PlumX Metrics