Recapture, Pass-Through, and Market Definition
20 Pages Posted: 16 May 2010
Abstract
We describe how the hypothetical monopolist test used to define relevant markets in horizontal merger cases can be implemented using the fundamental economic concepts of opportunity cost and pass-through. Unlike critical loss analysis, our approach analyzes the behavior of a profit-maximizing hypothetical monopolist, as called for in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. This approach also can provide a consistency check between relevant markets defined using the hypothetical monopolist test and claims regarding the pass-through of merger-specific efficiencies.
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