Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible, and How the System Can Be Fixed to Avoid a Recurrence

70 Pages Posted: 2 Oct 2010 Last revised: 17 Sep 2015

See all articles by Alyson Flournoy

Alyson Flournoy

University of Florida Levin College of Law

William L. Andreen

University of Alabama - School of Law

Rebecca M. Bratspies

City University of New York - School of Law

Holly Doremus

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

Victor Byers Flatt

Case Western Reserve University School of Law

Robert L. Glicksman

George Washington University - Law School

Joel A. Mintz

Nova Southeastern University

Dan Rohlf

Lewis & Clark College Paul L Boley Library

Amy Sinden

Temple University - James E. Beasley School of Law; Center for Progressive Reform

Rena I. Steinzor

University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; Center for Progressive Reform

Joseph P. Tomain

University of Cincinnati - College of Law

Sandra B. Zellmer

University of Montana - Alexander Blewett III School of Law

James Goodwin

Center for Progressive Reform

Abstract

The BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is destined to take its place as one of the greatest environmental disasters in the history of the United States, or for that matter, of the entire planet. Like so many other disasters on that list, it was entirely preventable.

BP must shoulder its share of the blame, of course. Similarly, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) – since reorganized and rebranded – has come under much deserved criticism for its failure to rein in BP’s avaricious approach to drilling even where it was unable to respond to a worst-case scenario in a responsible and timely fashion. But the problems run much deeper than a single risk-taking company and a single dysfunctional regulatory agency.

This report sketches out widespread regulatory failure, touching several agencies of the federal government and affecting several critical environmental statutes. Prepared by Member Scholars of the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR), it has two goals: (1) to identify how and why the regulatory system failed to protect the public and environment and prevent the BP disaster, and (2) to recommend the priority reforms that are essential to correct these regulatory deficiencies.

The report begins by laying out the shortcomings in the primary statute under which deepwater oil drilling is regulated – the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) – and outlines key reforms needed to provide the authority necessary to protect the public interest.

It then turns to systemic problems within the agency charged with regulation of deepwater oil drilling under the OCSLA – the Mineral Management Service (MMS), renamed the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) in the wake of the disaster. These include problems of agency capture and inadequate funding.

The third topic addressed in the report is the role of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) – how and why this landmark statute was disabled from performing its critical role in the case of the BP well, and what regulatory changes can ensure that it functions effectively in the future.

The report next details the problems that surrounded the implementation and enforcement of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) as it applied to oil drilling and recommends several key reforms.

The report then discusses a systemic problem that is a theme in each prior section and that specific statutory reforms cannot fully remedy: obstacles to making sound regulatory decisions in the face of uncertain, low probability risks of potentially catastrophic or irreversible harm. This section highlights a common sense solution: adoption of a precautionary stance. A precautionary approach would replace the current widely-adopted presumption that regulation must await a high – and often unattainable – degree of certainty, even when the potential costs are irreversible or catastrophic.

In the last sections of the report, we step back to look at the regulatory system from a broader perspective. We consider first how the regulatory system and its failures in this case were caused in part by the absence of coherent policies on energy and climate change. Our current policy provides vast incentives for risky oil and gas development like deepwater drilling and few for low-carbon alternative energy sources. In the wake of yet another painful lesson on the cost of our current incoherent approach, it is time to focus political attention on the difficult but necessary task of debating and adopting a coherent and sound energy policy.

In the final section, we step back geographically to suggest why another lesson of this disaster is that the United States should undertake to learn more from the experience abroad, offering the example of the North Sea. Had we been paying closer attention, the investigations and reforms in the wake of the infamous Piper Alpha spill or the Bravo platform blowout might have offered insights to help us avoid this disaster.

Keywords: BP Oil Spill, Regulatory Policy, Natural Resources, Public Safety, OCSLA, NEPA, ESA, Precautionary Principle, Energy Policy

JEL Classification: K32

Suggested Citation

Flournoy, Alyson and Andreen, William L. and Bratspies, Rebecca M. and Doremus, Holly and Flatt, Victor Byers and Glicksman, Robert L. and Mintz, Joel A. and Rohlf, Dan and Sinden, Amy and Steinzor, Rena I. and Tomain, Joseph P. and Zellmer, Sandra B. and Goodwin, James, Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible, and How the System Can Be Fixed to Avoid a Recurrence. U of Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010-49, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1685606, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1685606 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1685606

Alyson Flournoy

University of Florida Levin College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States

William L. Andreen

University of Alabama - School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 870382
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

Rebecca M. Bratspies

City University of New York - School of Law ( email )

2 Court Square
Long Island City, NY 11101
United States

Holly Doremus

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

790 Simon Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-643-5699 (Phone)

Victor Byers Flatt

Case Western Reserve University School of Law ( email )

11075 East Boulevard
Cleveland, OH 44106-7148
United States

Robert L. Glicksman

George Washington University - Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-4641 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=16085

Joel A. Mintz

Nova Southeastern University ( email )

3301 College Avenue
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33314
United States

Dan Rohlf

Lewis & Clark College Paul L Boley Library ( email )

10015 S.W. Terwilliger Blvd.
Portland, OR 97219
United States

Amy Sinden

Temple University - James E. Beasley School of Law ( email )

1719 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
215-204-4969 (Phone)
215-204-1185 (Fax)

Center for Progressive Reform ( email )

500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
United States

Rena I. Steinzor

University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law ( email )

500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201-1786
United States

Center for Progressive Reform ( email )

500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
United States

Joseph P. Tomain

University of Cincinnati - College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 210040
Cincinnati, OH 45221-0040
United States
513-556-6805 (Phone)
513-556-6265 (Fax)

Sandra B. Zellmer

University of Montana - Alexander Blewett III School of Law ( email )

Missoula, MT 59812-0002
United States
406-243-6653 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.umt.edu/law/faculty/directory/default.php?ID=5355

James Goodwin (Contact Author)

Center for Progressive Reform ( email )

455 Massachusetts Ave., NW, #150-513
Washington, DC 20001
United States

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