Theories of Harm in the Intel Case
41 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2010
Date Written: November 8, 2010
Abstract
Over the past several years, government competition agencies and private plaintiffs have sued Intel challenging the legality of its relationships with original equipment computer manufacturers (“OEMs”). These lawsuits have combined to produce a detailed account describing Intel’s relationships with OEMs and analyzing the competitive effects of these relationships. This paper uses the public evidence in this account as a starting point for further analysis of both competition in downstream markets and the structure of Intel’s contracts with OEMs. By presenting this additional analysis, this paper seeks to better identify the circumstances under which exclusive contracts can lead to anticompetitive harm.
Keywords: exclusive contracts
JEL Classification: K21, L12
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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