The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions

23 Pages Posted: 14 Nov 2010 Last revised: 20 Nov 2010

See all articles by Lee Epstein

Lee Epstein

University of Southern California

Tonja Jacobi

Emory University School of Law

Date Written: December 1, 2010

Abstract

Since the 1990s, there has been an explosion of empirical and theoretical work dedicated to advancing strategic accounts of law and legal institutions. Reviewing this extensive literature could be accomplished in multiple ways. We chose an approach that underscores a major contribution of strategic accounts: that they have forced scholars to think about the interdependent - i.e., strategic - nature of judicial decisions. On strategic accounts, in other words, judges do not make decisions in a vacuum, but rather take into account the preferences and likely actions of other relevant actors, including their colleagues, their judicial superiors, and members of the other branches of government. After defining strategic analysis and how it differs from other approaches to judicial decisions, we examine the literature on the forms of strategic behavior in which (preference-maximizing) judges engage when interacting with these three sets of actors.

Suggested Citation

Epstein, Lee and Jacobi, Tonja, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions (December 1, 2010). Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 6, pp. 341-358, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1708412 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102209-152921

Lee Epstein (Contact Author)

University of Southern California ( email )

2250 Alcazar Street
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

HOME PAGE: http://epstein.usc.edu/

Tonja Jacobi

Emory University School of Law ( email )

1301 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

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