National Culture and Corporate Governance

Sabri Boubaker, Bang D. Nguyen, Duc K. Nguyen (Eds.), “Corporate Governance: Recent Developments and New Trends”, Berlin, pp. 369-398, 2012

65 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2008 Last revised: 15 Dec 2014

See all articles by Wolfgang Breuer

Wolfgang Breuer

RWTH Aachen University

Astrid Juliane Salzmann

Catholic University of Lille - IESEG School of Management; RWTH Aachen University - Department of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 11, 2009

Abstract

In a series of cross-country comparisons, we show that national culture is statistically significant in differentiating countries with different corporate governance systems. Using the Schwartz cultural value model and data on corporate governance systems, we analyze the impact of national culture on six dimensions of corporate governance. Countries that have stronger emphasis on the dimensions of Embeddedness, Hierarchy and Mastery are more likely to have a bank-based system, countries with a stronger emphasis on Autonomy, Egalitarianism and Harmony tend to have market-based systems. The findings suggest several implications for the ongoing debate on convergence and divergence of corporate governance systems.

Keywords: national culture, corporate governance

JEL Classification: A13, G10, G30, N20, Z13

Suggested Citation

Breuer, Wolfgang and Salzmann, Astrid Juliane, National Culture and Corporate Governance (August 11, 2009). Sabri Boubaker, Bang D. Nguyen, Duc K. Nguyen (Eds.), “Corporate Governance: Recent Developments and New Trends”, Berlin, pp. 369-398, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1260746 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1260746

Wolfgang Breuer

RWTH Aachen University ( email )

Templergraben 55
D-52056 Aachen, 52056
Germany

Astrid Juliane Salzmann (Contact Author)

Catholic University of Lille - IESEG School of Management ( email )

Socle de la Grande Arche
1 Parvis de la Defense
Puteaux, Paris 92800
France

RWTH Aachen University - Department of Finance ( email )

Templergraben 64
Aachen, 52056
Germany

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