Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence: Economics and Politics - A Primer
17 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2011
Date Written: March 1, 2011
Abstract
In these notes we address the question of Central Bank Independence (hereafter CBI). We use a principal-agent model of the institutional regime. Citizens are the principals who demand CBI and the incumbent government is the agent which establishes the central bank regime, supplying it.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Masciandaro, Donato, Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence: Economics and Politics - A Primer (March 1, 2011). Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2011-85, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1791463 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1791463
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