Acquisitions, Entry and Innovation in Network Industries
39 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2011
There are 3 versions of this paper
Acquisitions, Entry and Innovation in Network Industries
Entrepreneurial Innovations in Network Industries
Acquisitions, Entry, and Innovation in Network Industries
Date Written: April 5, 2011
Abstract
Why do so many high-priced acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms take place in network industries? We develop a theory of commercialization (entry or sale) in network industries showing that high equilibrium acquisition prices are driven by the incumbents' desire to prevent rivals from acquiring innovative entrepreneurial firms. This preemptive motive becomes more important when there is an increase in network effects. A consequence is higher innovation incentives under an acquisition relative to entry. A policy enforcing strict compatibility leads to more entry, but can be counterproductive by reducing bidding competition, thereby also reducing acquisition prices and innovation incentives.
Keywords: Acquisitions, commercialization, compatibility, entry, network effects, innovation, R&D, regulation
JEL Classification: L10, L15, L26, L50, L86, O31
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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