Capitalizing on Capitol Hill: Informed Trading by Hedge Fund Managers
55 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2010 Last revised: 24 Feb 2017
Date Written: November 10, 2015
Abstract
This paper examines the hypothesis that hedge fund managers gain an informational advantage in securities trading through their connections with lobbyists. Using datasets on the long-equity holdings and lobbyist connections of hedge funds from 1999 through 2012, we show that hedge funds outperform passive benchmarks by 56 to 93 basis points per month on their political holdings when they are connected to lobbyists. Furthermore, the political outperformance of connected funds decreased significantly after the STOCK Act became effective. Our study provides evidence on the transmission of private political information in financial markets and on the value of such information to financial market participants.
Keywords: Hedge funds, lobbyists, informed trading, performance, information transfer
JEL Classification: G11, G23, G14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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