Fines and Damages Under EU Competition Law – Implications of the Accumulation of Liability

World Competition Law and Economics Review, September 2011

Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2011-05

42 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2011 Last revised: 21 Jun 2011

See all articles by Michael J. Frese

Michael J. Frese

Amsterdan Center for Law & Economics (ACLE); Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance (ACELG)

Date Written: April 26, 2011

Abstract

This paper identifies occurrences of negative interplay between public and private enforcement of EU competition law. For this purpose a detailed account of the premises underlying the EU’s dual enforcement system is provided against the background of efficiency, effectiveness, fundamental rights and proportionality. These four interests, both internal and external to the EU’s competition policy, can be affected if liability in parallel enforcement proceedings is either excessive or uncoordinated. While actors involved in the enforcement process are gradually recognising these risks, so far the solutions offered remain incidental.

Keywords: EU Competition Law, Decentralised Enforcement, Public Enforcement, Private Enforcement, Accumulation of Liability

JEL Classification: K21, K42

Suggested Citation

Frese, Michael J., Fines and Damages Under EU Competition Law – Implications of the Accumulation of Liability (April 26, 2011). World Competition Law and Economics Review, September 2011, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2011-05 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1788141 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1788141

Michael J. Frese (Contact Author)

Amsterdan Center for Law & Economics (ACLE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance (ACELG)

P.O.Box 1030
Amsterdam, 1000 BA
Netherlands

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