Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the SEC’s Rule to Facilitate Director Nominations

50 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2009 Last revised: 30 Jun 2011

See all articles by Ali C. Akyol

Ali C. Akyol

University of Ottawa

Wei Fen Lim

University of Melbourne

Patrick Verwijmeren

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)

Date Written: June 7, 2010

Abstract

Current attempts to reform financial markets presume that shareholder empowerment benefits shareholders. We investigate the wealth effects associated with the SEC’s rule to facilitate director nominations by shareholders. Our results are not in line with shareholder empowerment creating value: the average daily abnormal returns surrounding events that increase (decrease) the probability of passage of the proposal are significantly negative (positive). Furthermore, given an increase in the probability of passage of the proposal, firms whose shareholders are more likely to use the rule to nominate directors experience more negative abnormal returns.

Keywords: Director nominations, shareholder empowerment, proxy access, board effectiveness

JEL Classification: G34, G38

Suggested Citation

Akyol, Ali C. and Lim, Wei Fen and Verwijmeren, Patrick, Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the SEC’s Rule to Facilitate Director Nominations (June 7, 2010). Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA), Forthcoming, 23rd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2010 Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1526081 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1526081

Ali C. Akyol (Contact Author)

University of Ottawa ( email )

55 Laurier Ave E
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.aliakyol.com

Wei Fen Lim

University of Melbourne ( email )

185 Pelham Street
Carlton, Victoria 3053
Australia

Patrick Verwijmeren

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) ( email )

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
3000 DR Rotterdam, Zuid-Holland 3062PA
Netherlands

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