Willpower Taxes

60 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2010 Last revised: 14 Jul 2011

See all articles by Lee Anne Fennell

Lee Anne Fennell

University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: October 29, 2010

Abstract

Self-control and related concepts appear regularly in tax discussions, but often they are invoked hazily or blurred together with other aspects of choice over time. Despite the evident relevance of willpower to consumption patterns, wealth accumulation, and, ultimately, well-being, there is no consensus about whether and how heterogeneity along this dimension should factor into tax policy. There is support in the tax literature for such divergent responses as funneling more resources to low-willpower people, penalizing them for their lapses, and limiting their choices. Whether we should follow one of these approaches, or some other approach entirely, requires a careful analysis of willpower’s workings and its connections to well-being. To begin such an analysis, I focus on three categories of costs associated with willpower problems: the failure costs of suboptimal choices, exercise costs stemming from the willpower exertion itself, and erosion costs that relate to changes over time in willpower levels as a result of patterns of exertions and outcomes. With this framework in mind, I consider the effects of existing and proposed tax policy measures on people with different self-control levels. I then consider some alternatives that would address heterogeneity in willpower through a menu of regulatory bundles designed to induce self-sorting.

Keywords: tax policy, cognitive psychology, life-cycle hypothesis, self-control, behavioral public finance, precommitment

Suggested Citation

Fennell, Lee Anne, Willpower Taxes (October 29, 2010). Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 99, p. 1371, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1699916 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1699916

Lee Anne Fennell (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0603 (Phone)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
174
Abstract Views
2,237
Rank
311,080
PlumX Metrics