Measuring Maximizing Judges: Empirical Legal Studies, Public Choice Theory, and Judicial Behavior

15 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2011 Last revised: 6 Jun 2012

Date Written: July 1, 2011

Abstract

In this brief Article, I explore the growing empirical evidence in support of the public choice model of judicial decision making. Although legal scholars have traditionally been reluctant to engage in a critical inquiry into the role of judicial self-interest on judicial behavior, recent empirical studies confirm many of the predictions of the model. As a result, the public choice model has gained broad acceptance across a range of disciplines, courts, and even the U.S. public.

Keywords: judicial decision-making, public choice, law and economics

JEL Classification: K00, K40, K41

Suggested Citation

Shepherd, Joanna, Measuring Maximizing Judges: Empirical Legal Studies, Public Choice Theory, and Judicial Behavior (July 1, 2011). University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2011, No. 5, 2011, Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 11-164, Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-110, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1910918

Joanna Shepherd (Contact Author)

Emory University School of Law ( email )

1301 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-727-8957 (Phone)

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