Combating Antibiotic Resistance Through the Health Impact Fund

36 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2011 Last revised: 1 Nov 2011

See all articles by Kevin Outterson

Kevin Outterson

Boston University School of Law

Thomas Pogge

Yale Philosophy Department

Aidan Hollis

University of Calgary - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 22, 2011

Abstract

The Health Impact Fund (Hollis & Pogge 2008) is an innovative financing mechanism for global drug discovery and dissemination, separating the reward for successful R&D from the market price of the drug, also known as de-linkage. Aaron Kesselheim and Kevin Outterson have recently proposed a mechanism to reimburse companies for antibiotics according to their social value, but conditioned on achieving conservation goals to limit resistance (Kesselheim & Outterson 2010, 2011). This paper will explore whether this antibiotic resistance conservation proposal can be adapted to the framework of the Health Impact Fund. If these proposals can be meshed, then antibiotics might be an interesting therapeutic class for a test of the Health Impact Fund.

Keywords: health impact, antibiotic, resistance, pay-for-performance

Suggested Citation

Outterson, Kevin and Pogge, Thomas and Hollis, Aidan, Combating Antibiotic Resistance Through the Health Impact Fund (June 22, 2011). Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-30, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1866768 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1866768

Kevin Outterson (Contact Author)

Boston University School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

Thomas Pogge

Yale Philosophy Department ( email )

P.O. Box 208206
New Haven, CT 06520-8206
United States
203-4322272 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~tp4/index.html

Aidan Hollis

University of Calgary - Department of Economics ( email )

2500 University Drive, NW
Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4
Canada
403-220-5861 (Phone)
403-220-5262 (Fax)

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