Cooperation, Commandeering or Crowding Out? Federal Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy

23 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2011 Last revised: 13 Apr 2012

See all articles by Jonathan H. Adler

Jonathan H. Adler

Case Western Reserve University School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Date Written: March 21, 2011

Abstract

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) substantially alters the respective roles of the federal and state governments in health care policy. Beyond the individual mandate, the ACA presents many questions of federalism, both constitutional and policy-related. This paper, prepared for a symposium sponsored by the Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy, addresses some of these federalism issues. After outlining some of the policy considerations for determining the proper federal and state balance in health care policy, it identifies constitutional limitations on the federal government’s ability to direct or even influence state policy choices, before discussing how federal policy decisions can influence state policy choices and potentially retard positive reform efforts at the state level.

Keywords: health care, federalism, affordable care act, health care reform, cooperative federalism, conditional spending

JEL Classification: K10, K32

Suggested Citation

Adler, Jonathan H., Cooperation, Commandeering or Crowding Out? Federal Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy (March 21, 2011). Kansas Journal of Law & Pubic Policy, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2011, Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-5, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1791834

Jonathan H. Adler (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University School of Law ( email )

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