Corporate Governance, Enforcement, and Firm Value: Evidence from India

43 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2008 Last revised: 12 Mar 2012

See all articles by Dhammika Dharmapala

Dhammika Dharmapala

UC Berkeley School of Law; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Vikramaditya S. Khanna

University of Michigan Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2011

Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm value using a sequence of reforms in India (Clause 49) enacted in 2000, for which more severe penalties were introduced in 2004. The reforms did not apply to all firms and resulted in treatment and control groups of firms with overlapping characteristics. A difference-in-difference approach (controlling for various factors including firm-specific time trends) shows a substantial positive causal effect of the reforms in combination with the 2004 sanction increase. A regression discontinuity analysis, focusing on the thresholds for application of the reforms, leads to similar results. Across various specifications, the estimated effect is at least 6% of firm value. This effect is large, but comparable in magnitude to effects found in other studies of major corporate governance reforms, especially in emerging markets.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Enforcement, Sanctions, Firm Value, Tunneling

JEL Classification: G34, G38, K22, O16

Suggested Citation

Dharmapala, Dhammika and Khanna, Vikramaditya S., Corporate Governance, Enforcement, and Firm Value: Evidence from India (November 2011). U of Michigan Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 08-005, 3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Papers, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1105732 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1105732

Dhammika Dharmapala (Contact Author)

UC Berkeley School of Law ( email )

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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Vikramaditya S. Khanna

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734-615-6959 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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