Company Law, Lawyers and 'Legal' Innovation: Common Law versus Civil Law

Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2011-3

39 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2011 Last revised: 6 Jul 2012

See all articles by Francisco Reyes

Francisco Reyes

University of Fribourg, Universidad Javeriana

Erik P. M. Vermeulen

Tilburg University - Department of Business Law; Signify (formerly known as Philips Lighting) - Legal Department; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Kyushu University - Graduate School of Law

Date Written: August 10, 2011

Abstract

In this essay we make two major claims. The first is that public legislatures should think seriously about giving maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract in company law. This would not only give corporate lawyers the tool they need to provide legal services that match the needs of the current global business community, but also encourage legal experimentation. The second claim is that corporate lawyers in common law systems are more open to legal change and innovation than their civil law colleagues. The difference seems to lie in the more experimental nature of common law compared to civil law systems.

Keywords: business entities, civil law, common law, company law, corporate lawyer, legal origin, innovation and entrepreneurship, LLC

JEL Classification: K20, K22, L22, L26, L51

Suggested Citation

Reyes, Francisco and Vermeulen, Erik P.M., Company Law, Lawyers and 'Legal' Innovation: Common Law versus Civil Law (August 10, 2011). Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2011-3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1907894 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1907894

Francisco Reyes

University of Fribourg, Universidad Javeriana ( email )

Colombia

Erik P.M. Vermeulen (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Department of Business Law ( email )

Signify (formerly known as Philips Lighting) - Legal Department ( email )

Amstelplein 2
Amsterdam
Netherlands

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Kyushu University - Graduate School of Law ( email )

6-19-1, Hakozaki, Higashiku
Fukuoka, Fukuoka 812-8581
Japan

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