Alliances and Corporate Governance

51 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2009 Last revised: 1 Feb 2014

See all articles by Andriy Bodnaruk

Andriy Bodnaruk

University of Illinois at Chicago

Massimo Massa

INSEAD - Finance

Andrei Simonov

Michigan State University - Eli Broad Graduate School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: November 13, 2009

Abstract

We study the link between a firm’s quality of governance and its alliance activity. We consider alliances as a commitment technology that helps a company CEO overcome agency problems that relate to the inability to ex-ante motivate division managers. We show that well-governed firms are more likely to avail themselves of this technology to anticipate ex-post commitment problems and resolve them. The role of governance is particularly important when the commitment problems are more acute, such as for particularly risky/long-horizon projects (“longshots”) or firms more prone to inefficient internal redistribution of resources (conglomerates), as well as in the absence of alternative disciplining devices (e.g., low product market competition). Governance also mitigates agency issues between alliance partners; dominant alliance partners agree to a more equal split of power with junior partners that are better governed. An “experiment” that induces cross-sectional variation in the cost of the alliance commitment technology provides evidence of a causal link between governance and alliances.

Keywords: alliances, corporate governance, abnormal return and profitability

JEL Classification: G34, G23, G32

Suggested Citation

Bodnaruk, Andriy and Massa, Massimo and Simonov, Andrei, Alliances and Corporate Governance (November 13, 2009). AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1505652 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1505652

Andriy Bodnaruk

University of Illinois at Chicago ( email )

1200 W Harrison St
Chicago, IL 60607
United States

Massimo Massa (Contact Author)

INSEAD - Finance ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France
+33 1 6072 4481 (Phone)
+33 1 6072 4045 (Fax)

Andrei Simonov

Michigan State University - Eli Broad Graduate School of Management ( email )

645 N. Shaw Lane, 321 Eppley Center
East Lansing, MI 48824-1122
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.andreisimonov.com

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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