The International Politics of IFRS Harmonization

Accounting, Economics and Law 3, No. 2 (April 2013)

Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 11-132

47 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2011 Last revised: 8 May 2013

See all articles by Karthik Ramanna

Karthik Ramanna

University of Oxford - Blavatnik School of Government

Date Written: August 27, 2012

Abstract

The globalization of accounting standards as seen through the proliferation of IFRS worldwide is one of the most important developments in corporate governance over the last decade. I offer an analysis of some international political dynamics of countries’ IFRS harmonization decisions. The analysis is based on field studies in three jurisdictions: Canada, China, and India. Across these jurisdictions, I first describe unique elements of domestic political economies that are shaping IFRS policies. Then, I inductively isolate two principal dimensions that can be used to characterize the jurisdictions’ IFRS responses: proximity to existing political powers at the IASB; and own potential political power at the IASB. Based on how countries are classified along these dimensions, I offer predictions, ceteris paribus, on countries’ IFRS harmonization strategies. The analysis and framework in this paper can help broaden the understanding of accounting’s globalization.

Keywords: accounting standards, globalization, IASB, IFRS, politics

JEL Classification: D72, F53, G15, K33, M16, M41

Suggested Citation

Ramanna, Karthik, The International Politics of IFRS Harmonization (August 27, 2012). Accounting, Economics and Law 3, No. 2 (April 2013), Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 11-132, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1875682 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1875682

Karthik Ramanna (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Blavatnik School of Government ( email )

Radcliffe Observatory Quarter
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX2 6GG
United Kingdom

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